N. 43 - Luglio 2011
(LXXIV)
The Italian Mezzogiorno
A Brief history of the post-war years
di Marco Siddi
The
backwardness
of
Italy's
southern
regions
has
been
a
formidable
challenge
for
the
Italian
state
since
its
unification.
The
Italian
Mezzogiorno,
including
the
regions
south
of
Rome,
Sardinia
and
Sicily,
has
always
been
poorer
than
the
rest
of
the
peninsula.
The
socio-economic
problems
that
existed
at
the
time
of
Italy's
unification
(1861)
were
left
unsolved
and
almost
unchallenged
by
the
Italian
state
for
nearly
a
century.
It
was
only
after
the
Second
World
War
that
the
state
attempted
to
intervene
in
the
Mezzogiorno
to
rescue
its
economy
and
try
to
bridge
the
gap
between
North
and
South.
However,
the
large
state-financed
programs
of
the
1950s
and
1960s
achieved
far
less
than
its
creators
had
hoped.
The
term
Mezzogiorno
means
‘south’,
but
it
does
not
only
refer
to
the
geographical
position
of
the
Italian
regions
which
it
identifies.
It
also
relates
to
the
state
of
social
and
economic
backwardness
that
characterizes
these
regions.
After
the
Second
World
War,
traditional
agriculture
and
sheep
farming
were
still
the
main
economic
activities
in
southern
Italy.
Industry
was
almost
non-existent
and
the
Mezzogiorno
was
not
involved
in
the
process
of
post-war
economic
recovery
that
was
taking
place
in
northern
Italy.
Large
areas
in
the
southern
Italian
countryside
were
infested
by
malaria.
The
environment
was
hostile:
mountainous
and
hilly
regions
with
little
rain
and
poor
soil
dominated
the
landscape.
Irrigation
systems
were
completely
inadequate
almost
everywhere.
The
countryside
was
divided
into
large
estates,
where
the
land
was
farmed
with
old
and
inefficient
methods.
Many
landlords
lived
in
the
cities,
far
away
from
their
estates,
and
did
very
little
to
improve
agricultural
methods
or
transform
their
possessions
into
modern
and
competitive
farms.
Communications
between
the
cities
and
the
countryside
were
very
limited.
Poor
communications
and
the
scarcity
of
agricultural
products,
which
were
mostly
sold
on
the
local
market,
constituted
a
serious
obstacle
to
trade.
The
basic
infrastructure
–
schools,
hospitals,
streets,
aqueducts,
sewage
systems
–
were
largely
inadequate
and
insufficient.
In
1954,
49
percent
of
the
adult
population
of
the
Mezzogiorno
was
illiterate
and
85
percent
of
all
southern
Italian
families
were
classified
as
poverty-stricken.
The
number
of
unemployed
people
was
estimated
around
2
million
and
probably
another
two
million
were
underemployed.
Many
decided
to
migrate
to
northern
Italy
and
Lazio
in
order
to
find
employment
and
better
living
conditions.
Exasperation
led
those
who
did
not
migrate
to
undertake
radical
forms
of
protests,
such
as
the
occupation
of
lands
in
Calabria,
Abruzzi,
Sicily
and
Basilicata
during
the
winter
1949-1950.
It
was
in
this
context
that
the
government
of
the
Christian
Democrat
Alcide
de
Gasperi
decided
to
help
the
South
with
direct
state
intervention.
The
main
initiatives
launched
by
the
Christian
Democrats
included
an
agrarian
reform
and
the
Cassa
per
il
Mezzogiorno,
a
program
of
state-funded
agricultural,
industrial
and
infrastructural
projects.
These
initiatives
constituted
united
Italy's
first
serious
plan
of
state
intervention
and
aid
to
the
poverty-stricken
Mezzogiorno.
The
decision
to
implement
an
agrarian
reform
was
motivated
by
economic
and
social
reasons.
The
reform
had
been
part
of
the
program
of
all
the
post-war
parties
–
including
the
Democrazia
Cristiana,
that
emerged
as
the
main
party
in
the
1948
elections
– as
a
prerequisite
for
the
recovery
of
the
agricultural
sector.
The
large
estates
of
southern
Italy
were
not
efficient.
Thus,
land
was
to
be
redistributed
and
reorganized
in
order
to
lay
the
foundations
for
modern
and
competitive
agriculture.
The
agrarian
reform
was
also
a
response
to
the
peasant
demonstrations
that
took
place
in
Italy
in
the
winter
of
1949-1950.
In
order
to
secure
popular
support
and
defuse
social
tensions,
the
state
could
no
longer
ignore
the
demands
of
the
poor
southern
peasants.
Domestic
stability
was
essential
in
order
to
sustain
the
rapid
industrial
growth
that
was
taking
place
in
the
north
and
to
deprive
the
Communist
Party
of
the
support
of
discontented
peasants.
The
Christian
Democrats
hoped
that
the
agrarian
reform
would
placate
social
tensions
without
radically
changing
the
conditions
of
the
southern
peasantry,
so
that
poverty
would
still
force
many
southerners
to
migrate
to
the
north.
This
migration
was
considered
as
necessary
in
order
to
provide
the
northern
Italian
industries
with
the
cheap
labour
that
they
desperately
needed
to
sustain
the
post-war
economic
growth.
The
implementation
of
the
agrarian
reform
proved
largely
unsatisfactory.
The
criteria
for
the
confiscation
of
land
were
ambiguous.
In
Calabria,
for
instance,
only
‘unimproved’
arable
land
on
estates
over
300
hectares
in
size
was
liable
to
confiscation.
In
the
rest
of
southern
Italy
only
the
estates
worth
more
than
30,000
lire
were
subject
to
confiscation.
Landowners
could
avoid
confiscation
by
simply
dividing
their
estates
among
members
of
their
families.
In
addition,
the
concept
of
‘unimproved
arable’
land
proved
to
be
very
ambiguous.
Insignificant
‘improvements’
to
large
unproductive
estates
provided
landowners
with
a
good
excuse
to
avoid
confiscation.
The
700,000
hectares
of
confiscated
land
were
insufficient
to
satisfy
the
demands
of
all
peasants.
Moreover,
only
10
percent
of
the
land
was
in
fertile
areas,
while
the
rest
was
in
poor
mountainous
regions.
In
order
to
implement
the
agrarian
reform,
reform
boards
were
created.
However,
the
boards
were
not
able
to
effectively
tackle
the
challenge
they
were
confronted
with.
They
could
not
develop
a
coherent
policy
of
intervention
and
channelled
more
aid
towards
the
richer
areas
(such
as
the
Piana
di
Sibari
in
Calabria),
where
it
was
easier
to
create
profitable
and
competitive
farms.
The
poorer
areas
were
often
left
to
their
fate,
which
resulted
in
the
abandonment
of
large
arable
lands
during
the
decade
following
the
reform.
The
agrarian
reform
was
accompanied
by
another
project
of
state
intervention
in
post-war
southern
Italy,
the
Cassa
per
il
Mezzogiorno.
Like
the
agrarian
reform,
the
Cassa
lacked
a
coherent
plan
and
tended
to
favour
the
richer
areas.
Most
importantly,
the
project
was
undermined
by
the
presence
of a
large
and
expensive
bureaucracy,
as
well
as
by
the
practices
of
clientelism
and
corruption
in
the
award
of
building
contracts,
jobs
and
funds.
While
the
agrarian
reform
and
the
projects
financed
by
the
Cassa
were
taking
place,
the
Christian
Democrats
were
also
attempting
to
lay
the
foundations
for
mass
support
in
the
South.
In
order
to
secure
votes,
they
were
even
ready
to
make
a
compromise
with
local
mafiosi.
Clientelism
and
abuse
of
office
became
common
practices.
The
Christian
Democratic
party
(DC)
used
state
structures
and
money
to
pursue
its
own
political
interests.
In
this
process,
it
was
helped
by
the
Catholic
Church,
which
was
very
influential
in
southern
Italy
thanks
to
its
local
ramifications.
Throughout
the
1950s
and
the
1960s
the
Church
overtly
supported
the
Christian
Democrats,
both
at
national
and
local
level.
For
the
Vatican,
the
DC
constituted
an
essential
bulwark
against
Communism,
as
well
as a
political
force
that
would
resist
radical
social
changes.
The
collusion
between
mafia
and
politics
was
one
of
the
main
reasons
for
the
scarce
success
of
state
intervention
in
the
Mezzogiorno.
The
mafia
thrived
thanks
to
political
support
and
its
infiltration
of
civil
society.
The
large
amount
of
funds
channelled
by
the
state
into
the
South
provided
an
excellent
opportunity
for
the
mafia
to
make
economic
gains.
Local
mafia
clans
obtained
contracts
for
public
works
and
acquired
dominant
positions
in
cooperatives
and
land
reclamation
agencies.
The
mafia
also
played
a
crucial
role
in
the
intermediation
for
the
provision
of
labour
and
in
other
economically
significant
activities,
such
as
the
provision
of
water
to
the
cities.
In
order
to
be
able
to
carry
out
these
activities,
it
needed
the
collaboration
of
leading
politicians
both
at
local
and
at
national
level.
As
Patrick
Mc
Carthy
has
stated
in
his
Italy
since
1945,
‘mafia
found
a
solid
prop
in
the
DC
party’.
The
DC
tolerated
the
mafia's
infiltration
of
society
and
its
lucrative
economic
activities.
In
exchange,
the
Christian
Democrats
obtained
the
political
support
of
mafia
clans.
This
is
demonstrated
by
the
constant
growth
of
the
DC's
share
of
votes
in
cities
such
as
Naples
and
Palermo,
where
the
local
mafia
had
acquired
considerable
economic
and
political
power.
In
Palermo,
the
DC
obtained
14%
of
the
votes
in
1946,
25%
in
1952,
35.8%
in
1956
and
44.4%
in
1964.
Such
a
surprising
success
was
also
due
to
other
factors,
such
as
the
integration
of
right-wing
politicians
and
monarchists
in
the
ranks
of
the
DC.
However,
the
support
of
the
mafia’s
clientele
did
play
a
crucial
role
too.
State
intervention
in
the
Mezzogiorno
could
hardly
be
successful
if
public
funds
were
used
to
pursue
personal
political
interests
and
public
works
were
assigned
to
mafia-controlled
businesses.
These
problems
were
compounded
by
managerial
miscalculations.
Investments
in
the
industrial
sector
started
only
at
the
end
of
the
1950s.
Meanwhile,
the
gap
between
the
North
and
the
South
had
become
wider.
Most
industrial
centres
that
had
been
created
in
the
South
with
public
funds
were
isolated
and
ill-fitted
in
the
local
economy.
Their
production
was
based
much
more
on
the
demand
of
foreign
and
northern
Italian
markets
than
on
that
of
local
markets.
Furthermore,
these
industrial
centres
competed
with
the
small
local
industry
for
skilled
workers.
They
also
did
not
make
an
important
contribution
to
alleviating
the
problem
of
unemployment,
as
investments
went
mainly
into
sectors
in
which
the
ratio
labour
to
capital
was
the
lowest.
Consequently,
unemployment
and
underemployment
led
an
estimated
9
million
Italians
to
migrate
from
the
South
to
the
North
of
the
peninsula
in
the
years
1953-1973.
Migration,
deprived
southern
Italy
of
its
young
workforce.
This
vicious
circle
badly
affected
the
already
precarious
process
of
industrialization
and
economic
development
in
the
Mezzogiorno.
External
factors
proved
to
be a
further
burden
for
the
economy
of
the
Mezzogiorno.
Following
the
foundation
of
the
European
Economic
Community
(EEC)
in
1957,
Italy
had
to
adjust
itself
to
the
regulations
of
the
European
Common
Agricultural
Policy.
The
Italian
government
had
focused
its
negotiating
strategy
at
the
European
level
on
securing
benefits
for
the
national
industry
and
taken
a
more
compromising
stance
on
agricultural
issues.
Consequently,
among
the
agricultural
products
of
the
Mezzogiorno
only
olive
oil
was
as
heavily
subsidized
as
the
northern
European
agricultural
products.
The
accession
to
the
European
Economic
Community
also
contributed
to
the
outflow
of
labour
from
southern
Italy,
as
the
Italian
government
attempted
to
reduce
unemployment
in
the
South
by
encouraging
migration
towards
other
EEC
states.
This
also
led
to
further
depopulation
of
the
poorer
areas
of
the
Mezzogiorno.
As
has
been
shown,
the
backwardness
of
the
Mezzogiorno
persisted
also
after
the
Second
World
War.
This
was
due
mainly
to
the
inadequacy
of
state
intervention
in
the
South.
The
agrarian
reform
of
the
early
1950s
proved
to
be
insufficient
to
revive
the
agricultural
sector.
It
favoured
the
development
of
some
richer
areas,
but
it
completely
neglected
the
needs
of
the
poorer
peasants,
who
were
left
no
other
choice
than
to
migrate
to
the
cities
of
the
North
in
order
to
look
for
better
living
conditions.
Corruption,
clientelism,
private
political
interests
and
the
collusion
between
politicians
and
mafia
undermined
the
projects
of
the
Cassa
per
il
Mezzogiorno.
As a
result,
the
chronic
underdevelopment
of
southern
Italy
continued
to
be a
major
problem
for
post-war
Italy.
Riferimenti
bibliografici:
Allum,
P.
A.
Politics
and
society
in
post-war
Naples.
Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press,
1973.
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Piero.
Breve
storia
dell’Italia
meridionale
dall’Ottocento
a
oggi.
Roma:
Donzelli,
1993.
Chubb,
Judith.
Patronage,
power
and
poverty
in
southern
Italy.
Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press,
1982.
Duggan,
Christopher.
Italy
in
the
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War.
Politics,
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and
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1948-1956.
Oxford:
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David.
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Oxford:
Oxford
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1996.
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A
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Society
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politics
1943-1988.
London:
Penguin,
1990.
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Antonio.
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questione
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Roma:
Editori
riuniti,
1991.
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Carthy,
Patrick.
Italy
since
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Oxford:
Oxford
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2000.
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